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The United States and other Western countries stand
out as global leaders in development and human rights
(United Nations Development Programme 2014), yet some
groups continue to be marginalized with limited access to
the opportunities and institutions that make these countries
exceptional. This dissertation focuses on two such populations, criminal defendants and sexual minorities, with the
goal of documenting how legal and social systems shape
individuals’ economic behavior and well-being. Chapter 1
examines the impact of incarceration on criminal and labor
market outcomes in Harris County, Texas. Chapter 2 documents patterns of concealment among men experiencing
same-sex attraction in the United States and studies the costs
and implications. Chapter 3 analyzes how legal recognition
of same-sex unions impacts the labor market and fertility
outcomes for gay and lesbian couples in Sweden.

Chapter 1
The Criminal and Labor Market Impacts
of Incarceration
The United States currently has the highest incarceration
rate in the world (Walmsley 2009), a consequence of three
decades of dramatic growth in the prison population since
the late 1970s (Carson 2013). Over this same time period
governmental expenditures on police protection, judicial and
legal systems, and corrections also surged (Bureau of Justice
Statistics 1980; Kyckelhahn 2013). Recent estimates indicate
that the annual U.S. correctional population included over
7 million adults (Glaze and Herberman [2013]), and combined federal, state, and local expenditures on justice-related
programs topped $260 billion per year. Despite the reach and
cost associated with these changes to criminal justice policy,
causal evidence on how this use of incarceration has impacted
the population remains scarce (see Donohue [2009]).
This chapter investigates the impacts of incarceration
using original data from Harris County, Texas. The new data
are composed of over 2.6 million criminal court records
accounting for 1.1 million unique defendants, capturing
the universe of misdemeanor and felony criminal charges
between 1980 and 2009 regardless of final conviction status.
It is also linked to state prison and county jail administrative data, unemployment insurance wage records, public
assistance benefits, marriage and divorce records, and future
criminal behavior.
The research design leverages the random assignment of
criminal defendants to courtrooms as a source of exogenous
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variation in both the extensive and intensive margins of
incarceration. The courts are staffed by judges and prosecutors who differ in their propensity to incarcerate. As a
result, which courtroom a defendant is randomly assigned
to strongly predicts whether he will be incarcerated and for
how long. This increasingly popular identification strategy
has been used in a number of applications where judges,
case workers, or other types of program administrators are
given discretion on how to respond to a randomly assigned
caseload.
The application considered in this chapter is moderately
more complex than other potential uses of this research
design. Sentencing takes on multiple dimensions (e.g.,
incarceration, fines, and drug treatment), and judges display
nonmonotonic tendencies (e.g., a judge may incarcerate drug
offenders at a relatively higher rate but property offenders
at a relatively lower rate). Since failure to account for these
features of the data can lead to violations of the exclusion
restriction and monotonicity assumption, a new estimation
procedure is developed. In this new approach, I relax the
first-stage equation to allow the impact of court assignment
on sentencing outcomes to flexibly respond to observed
defendant characteristics. Because this can generate many
instruments due to the curse of dimensionality, the least
absolute selection and shrinkage operator (LASSO) is used
in conjunction with cross validation as a data-driven tool
to achieve disciplined dimension reduction without skewing statistical testing. I then use this approach to construct
instruments for each observed aspect of sentencing, not just
incarceration, to control for court tendencies on nonfocal
sentencing dimensions.
The empirical findings in this chapter indicate that
incarceration for marginal defendants is less attractive from
a policy perspective than has been shown in prior work. I
measure modest incapacitation effects while defendants are
in jail or prison: felony defendants are 6 percentage points
less likely to be charged with a new criminal offense while
incarcerated. This benefit, however, is offset by increases
in postrelease criminal behavior: each additional year that a
felony defendant was incarcerated increases the probability
of facing new charges postrelease by 5.6 percentage points
per quarter. These results are particularly concerning because
the incapacitation effect is disproportionately driven by misdemeanor charges, while the postrelease criminal behavior
shows mainly increases in felony offenses. Partially driving
this result is a pattern of former inmates being charged with
new crime types. In particular, I find that former inmates
are especially likely to commit more property (e.g., theft or
burglary) and drug-related crimes after being released, even
if these crimes were not their original offenses.
In contrast with prior work, I find strong evidence that
incarceration has lasting negative effects on labor market
outcomes after defendants have been released. I find that
each additional year of incarceration reduces postrelease
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employment by 3.6 percent points. Among felony defendants
with stable precharge earnings incarcerated for one or more
years, reemployment drops by at least 24 percent in the five
years after being released. Misdemeanor defendants show
a small increase in take-up of cash welfare payments, and
felony defendants show increases in Food Stamps benefits,
which provide further evidence of lasting economic hardship
postrelease.
The impacts of incarceration extend beyond recidivism
and labor market outcomes. Incarceration appears to negatively impact family formation and stability as measured
through marriage and divorce activity. While incarcerated,
young felony defendants exhibit significantly lower rates of
marriage that are not compensated postrelease, indicating a
net decline in marriage rather than a temporal shift. Further
supporting this conclusion, I find that divorce rates among
older felons increase while in prison and postrelease.
Using these new estimates, I reevaluate the welfare
impacts of incarceration. Because I cannot measure general
deterrence effects in my research design, the cost-benefit
exercise is partial in nature and only accounts for the administrative expenses, criminal behavior effects, and economic
impacts associated with the defendant’s own outcomes.
Using the most conservative estimates, I find that a one-year
prison term for marginal defendants decreases social welfare
by $56,200 to $66,800, of which negative impacts to economic activity account for 41–48 percent of overall costs. In
order for this sentence to be neutral in social welfare terms,
a one-year prison term for a marginal (low-risk) offender
would need to deter at least 0.4 rapes, 2.2 assaults, 2.5 robberies, 62 larcenies, or 4.8 habitual drug users in the general
population.

Chapter 2
Discrimination with Concealable
Characteristics: Evidence and Application to
Sexual Orientation in the United States
Economic research on discrimination, both theoretical
(Becker 1957) and empirical (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan [2004]; Charles and Guryan [2008]; Goldin and Rouse
[2000]) has classically assumed that minority traits are perfectly observable. In the context of race and sex, which form
the general foundation of existing research, such an assumption is innocuous. In the second chapter, however, I propose
a departure from this body of work through the consideration
of an alternative class of traits: concealable characteristics.
These traits are precisely defined by the fact that they are not
publicly observable. Instead, agents make an active decision
whether to disclose or conceal their minority status.
The proposed departure has important implications
from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. Given
the option to conceal, individuals who self-identify their
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minority status represent the subset of the population for
whom the benefits of disclosure outweigh the costs, which is
a classic case of selection bias. A potential consequence of
this bias, for example, could be that those likely to face the
worst discrimination conceal their type and generate censoring in the distribution of realized discrimination (i.e., what
is actually measurable ex post in equilibrium). As a result,
estimates based on self-reported status would underestimate
the true magnitude of discrimination faced in the population.
If we suppose that the researcher could measure innate
preferences, selection bias could be avoided, but standard
models that focus on wage penalties may fail to capture the
nuanced implications of discrimination. The costs of discrimination may be dispersed across multiple outlets (e.g., labor
market penalties and mental health costs), and the relevant
channel will uniquely depend on the individual’s concealment status. This stands in contrast to Becker [1957], who
concludes that zero or minimal measured wage penalties is
an indication that all or most minorities have found nondiscriminating firms and avoided punishment.
The specific application being considered in this chapter
is innate sexual orientation, a concept that is theoretically
distinct from self-identified sexual orientation. The former
category measures an individual’s private sexual attraction,
while the latter is the public presentation of one’s sexual
orientation.
Original empirical analysis illustrates how concealment
potential shapes life-cycle outcomes using data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. The chapter
leverages the fraternal birth order (FBO) hypothesis from
developmental psychology as a proxy measure for innate
sexual orientation in lieu of self-identified sexual orientation.
The FBO hypothesis is the culmination of numerous studies that have consistently found that men with more older
brothers are more likely to identify as homosexual or report
same-sex attraction (see Blanchard [1997]). This proxy for
innate sexual orientation is used in conjunction with varying
degrees of juvenile exposure to local discrimination against
the lesbian, gay, and bisexual community based on the
respondent’s county of birth in the United States. Studying
how these two sources of variation interact will allow the
chapter to consider how life-cycle trajectories change in
response to increasing motives to conceal, and whether early
life exposure to antigay policies and attitudes has long-term
implications past adolescence.
My evidence documents patterns of concealment and its
corresponding impact on individual outcomes. I find that
men who were more likely to develop same-sex attraction
yet born in more homophobic counties were significantly
less likely to engage in same-sex cohabitation through age
45 compared to similar men from less homophobic counties. Changes in identity investments (conservative gender
ideology and religious adherence) conform with this pattern,
and sizable penalties to mental health and educational attain-
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ment accrue to men from more homophobic backgrounds.
Labor market outcomes, however, appear to generally be
unaffected. I hypothesize that men who experience samesex attraction yet conceal it are compensated for this choice
despite their diminished human capital.

Chapter 3
Same-Sex Partnership for What? Evidence
from Swedish Registers
(coauthored with Lina Aldén, Lena Edlund, and
Mats Hammerstedt)
The last chapter studies how individual and joint outcomes evolve for same-sex couples after entering into a
legalized recognized union in Sweden. In 1989, Denmark
became the first country to legally recognize same-sex
unions. Since then, some 31 countries have followed suit, the
United States being the latest to legalize same-sex marriage
nationwide.
Despite growing demand, relatively little is known about
the function of legal same-sex unions. What is it that legal
status confers that cannot be achieved through private contracts or actions such as cohabitation? Arguably, the same
might be asked of the long-lived institution of opposite-sex
marriage.
But what holds for opposite-sex unions need not carry
over to same-sex ones. For instance, the returns to marriage
in the Beckerian framework rests on returns to specialization,
and same-sex couples appear to specialize less (Jepsen and
Jepsen 2002). Long-term commitment is another celebrated
function of marriage that may or may not translate to samesex couples (Andersson et al. 2006). A potentially more
thorny issue, however, is the so-called paternity presumption:
the husband is the presumed father of children borne by the
wife (Appleton 2006). Paternity presumption has until now
been a universal feature of marriage and one that may even
constitute its very core (Posner 1992). In fact, most samesex unions carve out paternity presumption, but even when
included, its application is far from straightforward. This is
so because of the strong rights accorded birth mothers. By
default, the mother is the woman who gives birth. If a man
in a same-sex partnership acknowledges paternity of a child
born to an unmarried woman, will the child have three parents? And if parental rights are at the heart of legal unions,
then what is its relevance to all-male, and thus sterile,
couples?
This chapter highlights the practical implications for
same-sex couples of greater access to legal rights formerly
reserved for opposite-sex couples by studying an expansion
of rights in Sweden. Starting in January 1995, same-sex couples could enter registered partnership, a contract that conferred almost the same rights and obligations as opposite-sex
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marriage. However, paternity presumption was carved out
in an innocuous-sounding exemption of rights extended to
one sex only. It would be another eight years until same-sex
partners gained the right to adopt jointly or as stepparents.
The new adoption law was enacted in 2002 and took effect
January 1, 2003. In this chapter, we analyze Swedish administrative data covering the period 1994–2007.
Derived from Swedish registers, these data are high quality, have universal coverage, and allow us to follow individuals. Using these administrative data, we identify and follow
all individuals who entered into registered partnerships in
1995–2006 (to allow for a post- and preunion year). For
comparison, we include all who entered opposite-sex marriage in the given period. The data contain detailed information on earnings and children living in the household, which
enables us to shed new light on how entry into partnership/
marriage affects labor market and parental outcomes. Our
empirical strategy is to compare outcomes of earnings and
presence of children before and after union entry, controlling
for individual fixed effects so that the person serves as his or
her own control group.
By exploiting longitudinal data, we can avoid the problem of selection into partnership (or marriage) that arises
in cross-sectional comparisons. However, the possibility
that partnership/marriage entry is timed to coincide with
other life changes remains. Milestones such as graduation or
steady employment may both trigger marriage and presage
earnings growth, resulting in an upward bias. On the other
hand, a downward bias would result if partnership/marriage
were timed to coincide with a downshift in labor market
attachment (e.g., due to parenthood or retirement). Therefore, our estimates provide a description of labor market and
parenting responses to partnership/marriage entry but cannot
isolate the causal effect of entry into partnership/marriage.
Our most noteworthy finding pertains to parenthood.
Following the 2002 adoption law giving those in a registered partnership the right to joint or step-parent adoption,
we see both a noticeable increase in lesbian partnership and
children living with lesbians in partnership. The net effect
of union entry on presence of children, especially after the
2002 reform, reveals similar effects of entry into legal union
status for lesbian and opposite sex couples—couples with at
least one woman. These findings highlight the importance of
a legal framework for parental rights; indeed, it underscores
the role of joint legal parenting for fertility decisions.
Turning to earnings, we find a substantial decline in
individual earnings for gay men (−12 percent), whereas for
lesbian women the effect is small (−2 percent) and highly
insignificant. As for couples’ earnings, the pronounced
decline seen for gays is absent, suggesting a high degree of
income buffering (or negative sorting). By contrast, among
lesbians, the income reduction seen at the individual level
is amplified once viewed at the couple level, suggestive of
within-couple positively correlated labor market responses to
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partnership entry. Within-couple earnings gaps change in a
direction consistent with this interpretation. Among lesbians,
there is a sizable (but statistically insignificant) reduction in
the within-couple earnings gap, whereas among gays there is
only a small and highly insignificant effect on the gap.
As a point of reference, we also look at heterosexual
couples and find effects of marriage largely in line with
what has been documented in the literature: an increase in
fertility, a decrease in women’s earnings, and an increase in
the within-couple earnings gap. Men earn substantially more
after marriage than before, but we find no evidence of a marriage premium employing our within-individual comparison.
Instead, we find a strong ramp up of earnings in the years
leading up to marriage. Given the negative marriage premium for women and the absence of a positive premium for
men, our finding that the combined earnings for the couple
decline after marriage is perhaps unsurprising.
Taken together, these findings paint a picture of same-sex
registered partnership filling a different role for same-sex
couples than marriage does for opposite sex couples, and the
roles are different for gays and lesbians. Generally speaking,
as evidenced by the earnings gap, specialization on union
entry is much more pronounced among heterosexual couples
and, if anything, higher among gays than lesbians. This is
particularly noteworthy given the close to zero fertility effect
among gays and similar fertility effects for women, whether
in a same- or opposite-sex union.
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